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RECENT DECISIONS
Trespass-Unseen Particles Constituting Invasion-Distinguished
from Nuisance. In the 1959 Oregon decision of Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co.,' the supreme court of that state re-investigated the fields
of trespass and nuisance and incorporated into the former modern
understanding which had previously been excluded from the aged
legal concept.
The defendant operates an aluminum reduction plant which expels
fluoride compounds in the form of gases and particulates which are too
small to be seen without magnification. Some of these substances
settled on the plaintiff's land and water and caused the poisoning of
his livestock. The plaintiff brought an action for trespass. The de-
fendant argued that if the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to support
any cause of action, the theory would have to be nuisance. The very
practical matter of the amount of damages was behind the defendant's
contention: the period of time involved was over four years; Oregon
has a six-year statute of limitations for trespass,' while a two-year
statute would be applicable to an action for nuisance.'
The court's opinion starts with a statement of the orthodox distinc-
tion between trespass and nuisance-one being an interference with
the plaintiff's exclusive possession of land and the other being inter-
ference with his use and enjoyment of his land--and recognizes that
for trespass, courts usually require that the intrusion be in some
palpable form.
Assuming the invading matter is of adequate substance, the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect invasions controlled the form of action
to be used under common law pleading.' The traditional example of
the difference is that one who throws water onto another's land is
causing a direct invasion, while one who builds a downspout in such a
manner that the water runs onto the land of another causes an indirect
invasion.' The form of action for the direct injury was trespass. In-
direct injuries were remedied by an action on the case, which included
1 342 P.2d 790 (Ore. 1959), cert. denied, 80 Sup. Ct. 739 (1960).
2 ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.080 (1959).
3 ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.110 (1959).
4 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 1.23, at 67 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 72, at 409 (2d ed.
1955) ; 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 224-25 (1939).
5 The most convenient sources to the history are 1 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra
note 4, at § 1.3; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 13; both of which cite more detailed
material. See also Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMB. L.J. 189 (1931).
6 Reynolds v. Clarke, 1 Strange 634, 2 Ld. Raym. 1390 (1725) ; cited as an illustra-
tion in PRossER, TORTS § 72, at 409 (2d ed. 1955).
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actions for nuisance. Subsequent development evolved the distinction
between injury to possession as trespass and injury to the use and
enjoyment of land as nuisance.
Against the foregoing history, it is readily seen how most courts
would arrive at the conclusion that the aluminum company's conduct
gave rise to an action for nuisance only. The easiest way to have dis-
posed of the case would have been to say that the fluorides were not
of sufficient substance to be cognizable in an action for trespass. Fumes,
smells, noise, smoke, and other unsubstantial forms are familiar as
nuisances; there would be no reason to treat the fluorides differently.
Moreover, it could be argued that the intrusion was indirect because
the defendant's conduct was merely to allow the fluorides to escape
from its plant. Additional factors were required to cause them to settle
on the plaintiff's property-a typical example of an indirect invasion.
The Oregon court did not fall into the mechanical pattern. It ob-
served that the size of the invading substance is not a reasonable basis
for distinction. One's possessory interest is as much interfered with
by the intrusion of unseen particulates as by the landing of shot from
a gun. The court adverted to the current knowledge of the identity
of energy and mass and said:
If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumentality which is
used in making an intrusion upon another's land we prefer to emphasize
the object's energy or force rather than its size. Viewed in this way we
may define trespass as any intrusion which invades the possessor's
protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by
visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured
only by the mathematical language of the physicist.7
The defendant's argument that the invasion was indirect was disposed
of summarily and technically incorrectly. The court had decided that
the fluorides were capable of causing a trespass. Because of this, it
said, the invasion was necessarily direct, so it did not have occasion to
decide if it would follow the lead of the Restatement of Torts,' which
does not recognize the direct-indirect distinction. Contrast this reason-
ing with the traditional water example, where the invasion was said to
be indirect if water was not thrown onto the plaintiff's land but was
allowed to flow there. The example itself illustrates the lack of reason
in the distinction. The person who throws a substance into his neigh-
bor's yard is hardly different from the one who erects a mechanism that
7342 P.2d 790, 794 (Ore. 1959).8 RESTATEmNT, TORTS § 158, comment h (1934).
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will be certain to do the same thing, especially if he does it for that
purpose.'
Having determined that the settling of the fluoride particles con-
stituted a trespass, the court set about distinguishing an earlier Oregon
case, Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows,"0 which held that the
owner of an outdoor motion picture theater could not maintain an
action for trespass against a neighbor whose bright lights faded the
quality of the picture on the plaintiff's screen. The court clearly indi-
cated its belief that the casting of light could in no circumstances be a
trespass." (Competing interests were then balanced and it was held
that the plaintiff could not recover for nuisance.)
The first step in distinguishing the Amphitheaters case was an in-
novation in the concept of trespass: in determining whether a trespass
had been committed, the court would invoke the balancing of interests
that is usually associated with actions for nuisance. It was said in the
Martin opinion that where there is no clear invasion of the usual type,
the first task is to determine whether an interest protectible under the
law of trespass has been invaded. This approach deviates from the
traditional view that the only interest within the scope of trespass is
exclusive possession and that any invasion of it is actionable.' The
nature of the competing uses would be evaluated in terms of relative
social utility (the glare of light from a race track would be an action-
able trespass to a hospital but not to a drive-in theater). The sensi-
tiveness of the invaded use would require consideration (if the invasion
causes no interference with the plaintiff's use of his land the trespass
9 It should be mentioned at this point that in addition to the direct-indirect distinction
between trespass and nuisance, there also developed a wilful-negligent distinction.
Trespass was said to lie for intentionally caused invasions, but for invasions resulting
from negligence the proper action was case. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 1.3 (1956).
Problems arose when a direct invasion was negligently caused or when the defendant
intentionally produced an indirect invasion. See Note, The Distinction Between Tres-
pass and Case, 3 SYDNEY L. REV. 147 (1959).
10 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
11 In the Amphitheaters case it was said that "the mere suggestion that the casting
of light upon the premises of a plaintiff would render a defendant liable without proof
of any actual damage, carries its own refutation." Id. at 343, 198 P.2d at 850. This
statement is based on the historical distinction outlined above. Proof of damages ordi-
narily is not a requirement in a trespass action although it is for nuisance. Nominal
damages can be had under the usual trespass approach because the law will "imply"
damages, if only the bending of a blade of grass. See PROSSER, TORTS § 13, at 57 (2d
ed. (1955).
12 The court makes its position clear with the following statement: "The Am phi-
theaters case can be explained in terms of this latter point of view, i.e., that the glare
of the defendant's lights could be regarded as an intrusion within the law of trespass,
but that the plaintiff had no right to treat the intrusion as actionable in view of the
nature of the plaintiff's use and the manner in which the defendant interfered with it."
342 P.2d 790, 794-95 (Ore. 1959).
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would not be actionable). The area in which the activities were being
conducted would be a factor in the balancing process.
It is difficult to think of conduct ordinarily creating a nuisance that
could not, under the doctrine of the Martin case, be seen as a trespass.
The question to be asked, then, is how trespass and nuisance would
differ. The Oregon court recognized that the approach it outlined
induces the two torts to coalesce.' 3 This is not to say that they are
merged for all purposes. Selection of the proper form of action would
no longer be controlled by artificial distinctions and often fortuitous
events, but by the severity of the invasion. Assume a situation in which
there is admittedly an invasion in the nature of trespass but the court
believes, upon balancing the competing interests, that the plaintiff's
exclusive possession should not be protected against it. This does not
preclude the conclusion that his use and enjoyment, primarily a matter
of sensibility, have unreasonably been interfered with. The substance
that causes no appreciable injury to the property in its present use
may still be of sufficient annoyance to lead the court to find that a
nuisance exists.
The importance to the parties in the Martin case whether the plain-
tiff's action was in trespass or nuisance centered around the applica-
bility of a six-year or a two-year statute of limitations. The Oregon
code allows six years for "an action for waste or trespass upon real
property,"" and provides that "an action ...for any injury to the
person or rights of another... and not especially enumerated... shall
be commenced within two years..." ---a catch-all provision.
At no point did the court discuss why the legislature provided dif-
ferent periods for the two forms of action. While the vigorousness
with which it dealt with the tresspass-nuisance relationship as a com-
mon law concept is exemplary, it would seem that inquiry into the effect
of pertinent legislation would be essential. Presumably the provision of
a six-year period of limitation for trespass represents a policy decision
by the legislature. Precisely what policies are behind statutes of limita-
tions is not always clear. 6 Fallibility of memory, of course, is easily
assigned to some differences in limitation periods; for example, oral as
33 "Here it is apparent that the law of trespass and the law of nuisance come very
close to merging. This is so because when inquiry is made as to whether the plaintiff's
interest falls within the ambit of trespass law the courts look at the interference with
the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land to determine whether his interest in exclu-
sive possession should be protected and thus the two torts coalesce." Id. at 795.
14 ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.080 (1959).
25 ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.110 (1959).
16 Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIo ST. L.J. 130 (1955);
Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1185-86
(1950).
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against written contracts. But in other instances the evidence neces-
sary to refute a claim is of the same kind, whether the period is long
or short, so other reasons must be sought.
Perhaps the comparatively long period allowed for trespass actions
is a result of the historically preferred position of rights in land. The
failure to provide specifically for nuisance, and the consequent relega-
tion to a shorter, catch-all group, may be a manifestation of the his-
torical reluctance to recognize personal sensibilities. An alternative
possibility for the difference in treatment, and very likely the correct
one, is that little consideration was given to providing a limitation
period for nuisance actons. If this is so, the proper inquiry would be
directed solely to what manner of intrusion the legislature was pro-
viding for with its six-year trespass statute. A conclusion that the
legislature contemplated that only those actions based on the tradi-
tional view of trespass should be included within the longer period is
probably unrealistic, in view of the failure to provide expressly for the
closely related action. In the absence of a clear legislative policy, the
result of the Martin case is not objectionable. The problem, however,
is inherent in cases where the court chooses to revolutionize tort con-
cepts and should be forthrightly dealt with.
The Washington Position. Like Oregon, Washington has a statute
of limitations that expressly includes trespass to real property (three
years)1" and a shorter, catch-all provision (two years "for relief not
hereinbefore provided for")" which has been held to include actions
for nuisance.'"
A number of early Washington cases20 applied the direct-indirect
test of causation and held that for actions cognizable at common law
in an action on the case, the two-year period is to be applied. In the
first of these cases,"' dealing with an overflowing irrigation canal, it
was said: "We must, therefore, conclude that, when our law makers
provided a three-year limitation for actions for 'trespass upon real
property,' they meant to include only such recovery as could have been
bad through the action of trespass at common law."2 If the quoted
passage is taken as an announcement that the abolition of the common
17 RCW 4.16.080(1).
1s RCW 4.16.130.
'9 Island Lime Co. v. City of Seattle, 122 Wash. 632, 211 Pac. 285 (1922).
20 White v. King County, 103 Wash. 327, 174 Pac. 3 (1918) ; Welch v. Seattle &
M.R.R., 56 Wash. 97, 105 Pac. 166 (1909) ; Denny v. City of Everett, 46 Wash. 342,
89 Pac. 934 (1907) ; Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Co., 35 Wash. 1, 76 Pac. 298
(1904).
21 Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Co., 35 Wash. 1, 76 Pac. 298 (1904).
22 Id. at 8, 76 Pac. at 300-01.
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law forms of action marked the final development of the law of trespass
as it will be applied in Washington, the much vaunted ability of the
common law to grow with our society will be stifled. It is suggested
that if the language is to be followed, it be interpreted to mean that
first the court must decide if the alleged invasion is within the scope of
trespass as it should modernly be understood, and if so, then the three-
year statute of limitations will be applicable.
There has been no indication that the Washington court is prepared
to alter its position. The facts of the Martin case are peculiarly similar
to the series of Washington cases between Mr. Riblet and a local cement
company.23 The Riblets' home is near a cement plant operated by the
defendant. Because of the plant operations, large quantities of cement
dust are emitted and are carried by the wind onto the plaintiff's prop-
erty. The first time the controversy was before the supreme court24
the plaintiff argued that the settling of the dust constituted a trespass
and that the three-year statute of limitations should apply. "[T] hey
continued to, knowingly and wilfully, cast the dust on Riblet's property
just as effectively and deliberately as if they had delivered it by truck
and dumped it there." 5 The defendant, as would be expected, pre-
sented the conventional argument that the damages were indirect be-
cause the intervening force of the wind was required, and that therefore
the action was on the case and the two-year limitation was the proper
one. 6 The court admitted that the plaintiff's argument was "ingenious
and quite persuasive"" but relied on the earlier cases28 and held the
two-year statute to be the applicable one. The Washington position is
well supported by authority. It is suggested, however, that decision of
comparable cases in the future should take into consideration the
reasoning of the Oregon court in the Martin case with a view to reach-
ing a more realistic distinction between the torts of trespass and
nuisance. TImOTHY R. CLIFFORD
23 Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 54 Wn.2d 779, 345 P2d 173 (1959); Riblet v.
Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45 Wn.2d 346, 274 P.2d 574 (1954) ; Riblet v. Spokane-
Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn.2d 249, 248 P,2d 380 (1952).
24 Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952).2 5 Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 16-17, Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41
Wn.2d 249, 248 P2d 380 (1952).
26 Brief of Respondent, pp. 16-24, Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn2d
249, 248 P,2d 380 (1952).
27 41 Wn. 2d 249, 258, 248 P.2d 380, 384 (1952).
28 It should be noted that in one of the cases cited by the court, Weller v. Snoqualmie
Falls Lumber Co., 155 Wash. 526, 285 Pac. 446 (1930), the parties agreed that the
two-year statute applied, so the question of trespass did not arise. The defendant's
operation of a sawmill caused cinders, soot, ashes, sawdust, and charred material to be
carried by the wind onto the plaintiff's land, rendering it unfit for use as a farm and
orchard.
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